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BOOK REVIEWS 
DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS. The United States and 
the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations. By Harold Karan Jacobson and 
Eric Stein. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1966. Pp. ix, 
538. $8.50. 
This book is essentially a detailed and lucid history of the nu-
clear test ban negotiations which started in 1957 and resulted in the 
Moscow Treaty of 1963, banning all except underground nuclear 
testing. 
The key to the approach which the authors have chosen is found 
in their title-"Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians." Certainly, the 
nuclear test ban treaty was a major international event. It dispelled 
the fears of many that further testing in the atmosphere would re-
sult in a dangerous release of radioactive products. In addition, the 
treaty could be a step toward further and more extensive agree-
ments to deal with the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
which many regard as the top priority problem in the maintenance 
of world peace. However, an historical narrative which is confined 
to chronicling the events leading to these achievements would dis-
regard what may be the most interesting and significant feature of 
the negotiations-the revelation of the processes and methods of 
diplomatic negotiation employed by both the Soviet Union and the 
United States to achieve a precise accord. Therefore, it seems to me 
that the title properly places the emphasis. 
During the more than ten years of disarmament and arms con-
trol negotiations in the United Nations which had preceded the test 
ban negotiations, it had been virtually impossible to focus the nego-
tiations on a practical program of arms control in counter-distinction 
to broad, sweeping generalities, such as the Soviet "Ban the Bomb" 
propaganda slogan of the 1940's, and sweeping declarations of the 
desirability of regulation and reduction of all armaments under 
adequate safeguards. Only in the early discussions of the Baruch 
Plan for international control of atomic energy in 1946 and 1947 
had the Soviet Union been willing to consider the vast arrangements 
which might be required for any arms control program. But in 1958, 
and for five years thereafter, the Soviet Union, having reversed its 
long standing practice in connection with this one problem, con-
centrated on the most precise details-the number of inspection 
posts that would be required, their location and composition, the 
organization and direction of an international control organ, and 
many other similar problems. Additionally, for the first time, scien-
tists played an appreciable role in the development and presenta-
tion of the positions of the negotiating powers. 
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In describing the significance of the negotiations, the authors 
point out that: 
[These negotiations] perhaps better than any other international 
negotiations which have been conducted since the end of the Second 
World War [reveal] how the United States has attempted to resolve 
the complicated issues relating to the formulation, implementation, 
and substance of security policy stemming from the emergence of 
nuclear weapons. They also offer sharp insights into the functioning 
of the international political system in the nuclear era and possible 
future developments. 
The negotiations provide the opportunity to test not only the sub-
stance of American security policy, but also "the consensus-building 
model" in formulating and implementing that policy. 
[The negotiations] illustrate in a graphic manner the interaction 
between domestic events, national policies, and international occur-
rences. They offer a striking picture of diplomatic intercourse be-
tween a totalitarian state with tightly sealed policy-making and 
close controls over its mass media on the one hand, and two rela-
tively open, pluralistic states on the other. 
The book achieves its greatest success in its discussion of the 
methods of formulating United States policy and both the achieve-
ments and limitations of that policy. The narrative demonstrates 
convincingly the impossibility of completely separating scientific 
and political considerations. The very nature of the technical prob-
lems requires an intermingling of scientific and political factors in 
establishing value judgments. The American and Soviet scientists 
might agree on the specific data and nevertheless reach diametrically 
opposed conclusions from the data on such essential matters as the 
significance of seismic signals. 
The narrative points out the many limitations, indeed handi-
caps, inherent in policy formulation in the United States--the occa-
sions when the American negotiators had to take positions in inter-
national forums in advance of obtaining the factual data to support 
their positions, the political considerations which delayed, some-
times for years, the formulation of positions which take into account 
the newest technical developments, the difficulties of obtaining in 
the highest levels of our government an understanding of the posi-
tions based upon new developments, and the obtaining of the neces-
sary policy clearances. Anyone reading this book will acquire some 
idea of one of the prime problems which has always confronted the 
negotiators in the field of arms control-the tremendous dilution of 
thought which takes place in transforming a technically sound posi-
tion into the broad general terms required for international negoti-
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ations. The reader will also realize that with the advent of the ad-
ministration of John F. Kennedy, came a gradual lessening of 
obstacles and delays in United States policy-making. 
It would have been highly desirable if the authors could have 
achieved a detailed analysis of Soviet policy-making along the same 
lines. However, access to the individual policy-makers in the Krem-
lin-the "one-feather indians" as well as the "chiefs"-was out of 
the question. The necessarily inadequate substitute is a close analy-
sis of the changing Soviet technical positions and their relationship 
to world events, a course which the authors have followed while 
recognizing that their conclusions, in many instances, can be little 
better than surmises. Perhaps the analysis might have benefited 
from greater reference to the substantial amount of literature which 
has appeared in the last three or four years in the Soviet Union, 
some of which has been translated into English, on Soviet strategic 
policy. I believe that this literature furnished one factor which 
would help to explain the increasing Soviet intransigence during 
the latter years of the negotiations on the question of on-site inspec-
tion. Nuclear capabilities can be achieved by the "have not" states 
through two methods: testing, or transfers from the "haves." Com-
mencing in 1961, the Soviet Union seemed to place more emphasis 
on the latter method than on the former. There is much evidence to 
indicate that Khrushchev's final agreement to a limited test ban 
stemmed from a belief that the next sJep which would follow quickly 
would be the unqualified prohibition of weapon transfers from the 
"haves" to the "have nots." In the absence of a satisfactory United 
States formula to achieve this result, further progress toward an 
unlimited test ban seemingly became a low priority in the Soviet 
Union. A more thorough discussion of the changing relationship 
between the test ban and other antiproliferation measures would 
have been useful, but would have greatly lengthened the book. 
In attempting a meaningful description of complex negotiations 
extending over many years, the authors are caught benv-een Scylla 
and Charybdis. A simple chronicle of events would be meaningless, 
since in any negotiations with the Soviet Union and particularly in 
arms control negotiations, the meaing of the events cannot be 
determined purely and simply from the statements of the parties. 
Every historian of the arms control negotiations must constantly 
embark on verbal excursions in order to relate the specific events 
of the narrative to the background. In the entire literature of arms 
control, I have never found any volume which has been more suc-
cussful in achieving the proper balance between narration and ex-
planation, in stressing the background of the developments without 
losing the continuity. Largely for this reason, I believe that this 
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book is and will continue to be the definitive narrative of an im-
portant historical episode. 
Bernard G. Bechhoefer, 
Member of The District of 
Columbia Bar.* 
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